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Market efficiency
The theory ofefficient markets does not
require everyone to process new informa-
tion quickly and accurately. Indeed, the
theory suggests that for most investors no
excess profits will be made from spending
resources in such analysis. Since asset prices
rapidly reflect all relevant information, one
cannot systematically better the overall rate
ofreturn without also having systematic
access to superior information. The best
strategy for most participants is to buy and
hold awell-diversified portfolioofsecuri-
ties. The theory, however, does require that,
at the margin, where prices are determined,
rational agents existto determine asset
values correctly, and that these agents are
sufficiently rewarded for their efforts.
Frequently used tests ofwhether financial
markets correctly process information
involve searching for methods ofearning
"excess" profits, either through discovering
a successful trading rule orby finding some
significantcorrelation between excess
returns and past observable information.
However, some have questioned the ability
ThisLetter examines some current
arguments in support ofKeynes. These
arguments and their supporting evidence
contend that prices in the stock, bond, and
financial futures markets vary too much in
the short term to be justified by changes in
people's expectations ofthe fundamental,
underlyingdeterminants ofthe values of
these financial instruments.
mation about the fundamentals determining
stock and bond prices in buyingthese assets.
Moreover, the powerofprofit-seeking arbi-
trage prevents any market participants from
continually earningexcessive profits by
ensuring that incorrectly valued assets are
systematically discovered and boughtor
sold until their prices are brought into line
with their correct underlying value.
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WhetherKeynes' representation ofthe stock
market is accurate is still an unresolved issue
in economics. Mostfinancial economists
disagree with the idea that financial markets
can be irrationally influenced by psycholog-
ical factors. Instead, they claim that asset
price movements are the results ofchanging
market expectations ofrelevant economic
factors. According to this efficientmarkets
hypothesis, investors use all available infor-
J.M. Keynes, in Chapter 12 ofhis book
The General Theory, used a metaphor to
describe the importance ofpsychology in
determining stock prices. Keynes likened
the process by which the investors value
shares to popular newspaper contests ofthe
1930s in England. The prizewas awarded to
the competitor whose choice ofthe prettiest
beautycontestantmost nearlycorresponded
to the average preferences ofall the com-
petitors taken together. The contest then
became "nota case ofchoosing those
which, to the best ofone's judgement are
really the prettiest, nor even those which
average opinion genuinely thinks the pretti-
est. Wehave reached thethird degreewhere
we devote our intelligences to anticipating
whataverage opinion expects average opin-
ion to be."
His critique offinancial markets was an
importantjustification for proposinggovern-
ment intervention in depressed times. The
gambling nature ofinvestors, made upof
unstable psychological factors, was seen
by Keynes as creating problems for an
economy. He believed that these specu-
lative influences on stock and bond prices
often discouraged productive investment.
For this reason, he forecast that the gov-
ernment would have to take a more active
role in encouraging investment, perhaps by
undertaking moreofinvestment directly,
rather than leaving itto the vagaries of
the speculative psychology ofthe private
market.
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ofthese tests to proveordisprovethe theory,
When applied to artificially generated data
of asset returns that incorporate some form
ofmarket inefficiency, e,g" persistentexcess
returns, these tests sometimes wrongly
accept the hypothesis that the "market" is
efficient in the pricingofthese assets,
Recently, an alternative form oftest of
market efficiency has been developed that
looks at the movements ofasset prices
relative to the movements oftheirfunda-
mental determinants, These volatility tests,
as they are called, seek to judgewhetherthe
observed variabilityofpricescan be justified
in terms ofthe volatility ofthe underlying
determinants, Unlikethose discusssed
above, these tests do notdirectly address
the same issue ofwhetherexcess profit
opportunities exist Instead, they question
rationality by testing whether asset prices
over-reactto the arrival ofnew information,
Stock and bond markets
Theory says thatthe valueofa firm's stock,
and hencetheprice investors should bewill-
ing to pay for it, should be equal to the
discountedvalueofits currentand expected
future earnings. Today's stock price for a
firm therefore should be a weighted average
ofpresent and future earnings, where the
weights depend on how far in the future the
earnings occur. (Earnings far in the future,
forexample, will get a relatively lowweight
because they will be heavilydiscounted
compared to earnings generated sooner.)
The intuition behind volatility tests is that a
stock price, because it is an average, should
move less than the individualearnings com-
ponents that comprise it Limits can then be
derived from theory for how variable stock
prices should be in relation to the variability
ofthe underlyingearnings.
For the stock market, Robert Shiller ofYale
University used a real dividend series of
stocks as a proxy for earnings, and calcu-
lated from the variabilityofthose dividends
around their long-run growth path alimitan
the corresponding variability in the value of
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the stock, Comparinghis result with stock
prices, he found that the latter move too
muchfortheirmovementstobe attributedto
newinformation aboutfuture real dividends,
Shiller used the average real return on stocks
overtwo sample periods (1871-1979 and
1928-1979) as the discount rate for calcu-
lating the present value ofthe stocks.
Changes in the discountrate used by
investors could add to the volatilityofstock
prices, butShillerargued that the variability
in real returns that would be necessary to
justify the observed variability ofstock
prices was unreasonably large. Itwas much
larger, forexample, than the observed
variability ofshort-term nominal interest
rates, Shillerclaimsthatnominal rates should
be expected to be more volatile than real
rates, thus making itdifficultto accept
changes in discountfactors as an explanation
forthe high variability in stock prices.
Shiller performed similartests for the bond
market According to the expectations
theory ofthe term structure ofinterest rates,
long-term rates can be approximated byan
average ofshort-term rates expected over
the maturityofthe bond. To clarify his point,
Shillerfirstcalculated a "pseudo" long-term
rate usingactual subsequent short rates, The
resulting series of"rationally" derived long
rates was strikingly more stable than that
observed. His tests concludethat the vola-
tilityofobserved yields (and hence prices)
on bonds alsoappears to be excessive rela-
tive to what a rational model ofbond pricing
would suggest
Information in market forecasts
Some analysts believe that the volatility of
futures prices suggests market inefficiencies
as well. One implication ofefficient markets
is that a futures contract on a financial instru-
ment is an unbiased predictorofthat asset's
expected price, properly discounted and
adjusted for uncertainty and transaction
costs, Marketparticipants are supposed to
use all available information, and create the
best forecast when agreeing to delivertheTom Klitgaard
Theevidencepresented agrees with Keynes'
notion that inherently unstable psycho-
logical factors dominate financial markets
at least some ofthe time. This evidence,
though, has not been nearly enough to con-
vince most financial economists to reject
the theoryofefficientmarkets. For instance,
recent studies question the robustness of
Shiller's results to modifications in his
methodology and data. Also, the observed
volatility can be rationalized as reflecting
the inability ofmarkets to forecast. Still,
it appears the efficient markets hypothesis
no longeroccupies the practically unassail-
able position itonce enjoyed.
expects the average ofall future short-term
rates to rise byaroughlycomparableamount.
Just likethe futures market in foreign cur-
rency, the bond marketseems to behave as if
it believed today's short-term rate was the
best guess for all future short-term rates. This
implies that any movement in short rates is
expected to persist, causing long rates to
adjust accordingly.
Conclusion
How could financial markets fail to be
rational? Experiments in the field ofcogni-
tive psychology have documented Ihe ten-
dencyof individuals to over-react to new
information when making decisions that
involve calculating probabilities. Also, the
difficultyeconomists have in testing ration-
ality implies that the market itselfmay have
trouble decidingwhich movements of
prices are in linewith changing economic
fundamentals. And even those whosucceed
in correctly processing information will not
necessariIy be rewarded for theirefforts if
thedominantmajority is "irrationaL" When
the market's psychology is strongly bent in
one direction, contraryeffort may notbe
profitable enough, when discounted, to be
worthwhile. It may iri fact be quite
unprofitable.
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Various studies indicate, however, that
futures prices, whiIe unbiased estimates of
subsequent spot prices, frequently are no
more accurate than a simple extrapolation
ofthe current spot price. In otherwords,
today's spot rate seems as good aguess of
the future as the futures prices, suggesting
perhaps that-unlike what an efficient
markets view would argue-participants in
futures markets make little effort to forecast
prices.
The same phenomenon can be observed in
the strong co-movements oflong- and short-
term interest rates. For long rates to go up as
much as short rates implies that the market
The similarity offutures price and spot price
behaviorcan be seen in the chart. From an
efficient markets hypothesis, futures prices
should move less than their corresponding
spot prices. The change in price ofthe
underlying asset overthe length ofa futures
contract is the result ofa number ofdaily
changes, each in response to new informa-
tion. A futures price should then notmove
nearly as much as the spot price because the
value ofeach day's news is small in compar-
ison to all that will be learned before the
futures contract runs out. The chart plots
daily changes from June 27 toJuly 15,1983
in the U.5./German spot exchange rate and
the value ofits corresponding futures
contractsdueapproximatelytwomonths and
five months hence. The fact that differences
in daily changes in the futures prices, in
response to new information, compared to
the corresponding changes in spot prices is
insignificant relative to the daily volatility
suggests that little in the way offorecasting
is involved in the determination offutures
prices.
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underlyingasset at some future date. Effi-
ciency requires any divergence ofthe
eventual price from this predicted price to
be uncorrelated with past information. Ifthis
were notthe case, there would be an oppor-
tunity to use this information to make extra
profits.U018U!ljSE'M. lj~.'ln • UO~aJO • E'peAdN • oqE'PI
















Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
o ar ercen
loans(gross, adjusted) and investments* 161,505 - 292 - 1,125 - 0.7
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 141,458 - 11 - 687 - 0.5
Commercial and industrial 4~,058 - 7 - 2,620 - 5.7
Real estate 56,979 120 - 498 - 0.9
loansto individuals 24,493 69 962 4.1
Sewrities loans 2,333 - 464 - 207 - 8.1
U.s. Treasury securities* 7,379 - 162 816 12.4
Other securities* 12,667 - 119 - 1,254 - 9.0
Demand deposits - total# 43,842 943 1,672 4.0
Demand deposits - adjusted 30,285 736 2,319 8.3
Savings deposits - totalt 66,012 - 438 34,490 109.4
Time deposits - total# 67,321 120 - 32,102 - 32.3
Individuals, part. & corp. 61,520 101 - 28,042 - 31.3









Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings










*Excludes trading account securities.
# Inc;ludes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts; Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
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